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QUALIFIED DISCLAIMER OF JOINT TENANCIES: A 
POLICY AND PROPERTY LAW ANALYSIS 
D.L. Uchtmann * 
H.E. Hartnell * * 
INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 enacted a federal disclaimer provi-
sion under which no federal gift tax is incurred by the disclaimant if the 
requirements for a "qualified disclaimer" are met.2 In a number of 
private letter rulings, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that disclaim-
ers made by surviving joint tenants were not qualified because there 
had been a prior acceptance of the interest or its benefits.3 To support 
this conclusion, the Service relied" upon the ancient property concept 
that a joint tenant is seised both of the whole and of the part from the 
moment the tenancy is created.4 
The position of the Service regarding the disclaimer of joint ten-
• Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Urbana. B.S., 1968, Uni-
versity of Illinois; M.A., 1972, University of Leeds; J.D., 1974, Cleveland State University. Mem-
ber, Ohio and Illinois bars. 
•• Research assistant, agricultural law, University of Illinois, Urbana. B.A., 1976, J.D., 
1980, University of Illinois. 
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
2. I.R.C. § 2518(b) defines a qualified disclaimer as: 
an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest in property but 
only if-
(1) such refusal is in writing, 
(2) such writing is received by the trausferor of the interest, his legal representative, or 
the holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest relates not later than 
the date which is 9 months after the later of-
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such person is made, or 
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21, 
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits, and 
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on the part of 
the person making the disclaimer and passes either-
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or 
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer. 
I.R.C. § 2045 refers to § 2518 for the estate tax consequences of a disclaimer. 
3. See text & notes 38-50 infra; I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3). 
4. See 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11619 (1979). 
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ancy property is important both because of the increasing number of 
states that have adopted disclaimer statutes applicable to joint tenancy 
properties and the widespread use of joint tenancy ownership between 
spouses, especially farm couples.s Spouses often utilize the joint ten-
ancy form of ownership because it provides a simple way of accom,-
plishing many estate planning goals unrelated to tax minimization. 
Regrettably, the joint tenancy form of ownership often results in an 
estate tax disaster in larger estates when the total estate tax burden of 
both spouses is finally determined. Many a surviving spouse does not 
fully appreciate this fact until after the other spouse has died. If the 
disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest is a qualified disclaimer, a surviv-
ing spouse can effect a post mortem cure of this tax disaster by forfeit-
ing the right of survivorship6-something the couple probably would 
have done before death if the couple had sought and received sound 
estate planning advice. But if the disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest 
is not a qualified disclaimer, many couples who have not terminated a 
joint tenancy during their lifetime will pay considerably more total es-
tate tax than couples possessing identical wealth who transformed their 
joint tenancy interests into other forms of property ownership more 
compatible with estate tax minimization objectives. 
In light of the present position of the Service on the issue of joint 
tenancy disclaimers and the importance of this issue in many estates, a 
thorough analysis of this issue is warranted. The following sections of 
this Article will examine: 1) whether such a disclaimer should be 
treated as a "qualified disclaimer" on policy grounds; and 2) whether a 
disclaimer or the "accretive portion" of a joint tenancy interese by a 
surviving joint tenant meets the technical requirements of a "qualified 
disclaimer" under federal law in light of contemporary property law.8 
5. Despite the scarcity of empirical research, co=entators suspect that joint tenancies en-
joy wide popularity today. Mattis, Severance of Joint Tenancies by Mortgages: A Contextual Ap-
proach, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27, 38-40. An empirical study ofIowa counties suggested a preference 
for joint tenancy over tenancy in co=on. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and 
Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REV. 582, 617, 623 {l966}. See D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF GIFTS, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 657 (1977). For a listing of states expressly providing for 
the disclaimer of joint tenancy interests, see note 19 infta. 
6. Of course, the right of survivorship is what made joint tenancy attractive in the first place. 
7. The "accretive portion" in a joint tenancy is the one-half undivided interest effectively 
passing from the deceased joint tenant to the surviving joint tenant by right of survivorship. The 
initial one-half undivided interest held by the survivor plus the accretive portion passing at death 
results in outright ownership of the whole property by the survivor. 
8. The facts in this discussion generally involve joint tenancies in real property between 
husband and wife, but the arguments are just as persuasive in a nonmarital, personal property 
setting. The requirements for the existence of a joint tenancy estate are that the co-owners "have 
one and the same interest accruing by one and the same conveyance co=encing at one and the 
same time and held by one and the same undivided possession." Hood v. Co=onwealth Trust & 
Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 423, 34 N.E.2d 414, 420 (1941). Although the four unities (time, title, 
interest, and possession) were strictly required at co=on law, Jackson v. O'Connell, 23 Ill. 2d 52, 
55-56, 177 N.E.2d 194, 195 (1961), these strict requirements have been modified over centuries, 
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I. DISCLAIMER OF THE ACCRETIVE PORTION BY THE SURVIVING 
JOINT TENANT: A POLICY ANALYSIS 
A. A Sketch 0/ Federal Estate and Gfft Taxation Policies 
In addressing the policy question of wheth~r the disclaimer of a 
joint tenancy interest should be treated as a qualified disclaimer under 
federal law, it will be helpful to sketch the various policies that under-
pin the federal estate and gift tax system. The American Law Institute 
articulated seven goals in formulating recommendations for reform of 
the federal estate and gift tax system: 
In relation to any proposals in the gift and estate tax area, a decision 
must be made on the goals which tax legislation in this field is 
designed to accomplish. The goals which have guided this Study are 
as follows (not necessarily listed in the order of their importance): 
(1) to produce revenue; 
(2) to impose reasonable restrictions on the inheritance of wealth; 
(3) to guard against the destruction of incentives to accumulate 
wealth; 
(4) to reduce, if not eliminate, the circumstances under which the 
form of a transfer will affect the tax result; 
(5) to have a tax system that is readily understandable in the nor-
mal and routine transfer situations; 
(6) to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner; and 
(7) to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair. 
It is obvious that in some instances the achievement of some of these 
goals will call for solutions directly opposite to the achievement of 
other goals. In such instances, a decision has to be made as to which 
goals should predominate.9 
To determine whether these underlying policies are served by the 
Service's position regarding the disclaimer of joint tenancy interests, it 
is necessary to identify the practical consequences of that position. 
B. .Disallowing the .Disclaimer: Practical Results 
The consequences of the Service's position that a surviving joint 
tenant cannot disclaim the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest 
because of a prior acceptance can best be seen by example. Since the 
issue of disclaiming joint tenancies is especially important in agricul-
particularly concerning the unity of time. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 616. Contemporary 
statutes frequently provide for the creation and existence of joint tenancies. 
At common law, a joint tenancy between spouses also involved a fifth unity, that of person. 
Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 272, 63 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954). This particular estate, a tenancy 
by the entirety, still exists in many states. In other states, there is no property law difference 
between a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy between spouses. For a helpful discussion 
of property law, see 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1770-1833 (1979). 
9. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REpORTERS' STUDIES 78 (1969). 
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tural estates, the following examples deal with land held by a farm 
couple. 
In both examples, the couple's only property is assumed to be 
farmland worth one million dollars.1O It is further assumed that the 
farm real estate was acquired through the equal contributions of both 
spouses and that the annual rate of appreciation in value is zero. De-
ductions for debts, estate administration expenses, state death taxes, 
and other expenses are assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity. 
In the first example, the farm real estate is held by the husband 
and wife as equal tenants in common with each spouse bequeathing his 
or her interest to the other at death. In the second example, the farm 
real estate is assumed to be held by the husband and wife as joint ten-
ants with right of survivorship. Both examples illustrate the total fed-
eral estate taxes paid by husband and wife before the property is finally 
distributed to the next generation, assuming one spouse survives the 
other by at least ten years. 
EXAMPLE 1. Tenancy in Common Ownership: Effective Disclaimer 
by Surviving Spouse 
First spouse dies in 1981; $500,000 individual interest in 
farm real estate bequeathed to surviving spouse; surviv-
ing spouse executes qualified disclaimer allowed under 
present law by which the real estate passes to children: 
Federal Estate Tax Payable ..... '" ................... , .... $108,80011 
Surviving spouse dies ten years later, without remarry-
ing; leaves $500,000 undivided interest in real estate to 
children: 
Federal Estate Tax Payable ............................... , $108,800 
Total Tax Paid in Both Estates ........................... , $217,600 
EXAMPLE 2. Joint Tenancy Ownership: Disclaimer Disallowed by 
Service 
First spouse dies in 1981; $500,000 undivided interest in 
farm real estate passes to surviving spouse; disclaimer 
by spouse disallowed by the Service: 
Federal Estate Tax Payable ................................. $23,80012 
10. The example is not at all unrealistic. It could represent a 300 acre Illinois farm worth a 
little over $3000 per acre. 
II. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010. A $500,000 adjusted gross estate minus a zero marital deduc-
tion equals a $500,000 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $155,800 in tentative tax from 
which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit (available in 1981 and thereafter). Assume the 
$108,800 is paid by selling farm real estate of equivalent value. The identical calculation also 
applies to the estate of the surviving spous~ ten years later. 
12. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010. A $500,000 adjusted gross estate minus a $250,000 marital 
deduction equals a $250,000 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $70,800 in tentative tax 
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Surviving spouse dies ten years later without remarry-
ing; leaves $976,200 in farm real estate to children: 
991 
Federal Estate Tax Payable ................................ $289,51813 
Total Tax Paid in Both Estates ............................ $313,318 
c. Examination of Practical Results in Light of Federal Estate and 
Gift Tax Policies 
The position of the Service that a joint tenancy interest cannot be 
disclaimed for federal estate and gift tax purposes is clearly in conflict 
with at least three of the general goals attributed to our federal estate 
and gift tax system by the American Law Institute. Specifically, such a 
position is inconsistent with the goals "to reduce, if not eliminate, the 
circumstances under which the form of a transfer will affect the tax 
result," "to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner," and 
"to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair."14 
In both examples above, the original intent of the parties was to 
have the surviving spouse own all of the farm real estate. In the first 
example, the surviving-spouse acquires the second half of the property 
by testate succession; in the second example, the surviving spouse ac-
quires the accretive portion of the joint tenancy interest by right of sur-
vivorship. In effect, the only difference between these examples is the 
form of the anticipated transfer of the second one-half undivided inter-
est to the surviving spouse. Yet, under the Service's present position, 
this subtle difference in form is of critical importance because the trans-
fer by will can be disclaimed whereas the transfer by right of survivor-
ship cannot. The resulting tax cost of this subtle difference in form is 
almost $100,000 under the circumstances of the above examples. 
Furthermore, the parties in the examples are similarly situated up 
to the time of the first spouse's death. In both examples the parties are 
married, the total property rights are initially divided equally between 
the spouses, the combined wealth of the husband and wife is exactly 
one million dollars, the children ultimately receive the property, and, as 
will be apparent in the later technical analysis, the right of each spouse 
to enjoy his or her undivided interest in the real estate is essentially 
identical. Nevertheless, under the present position of the Service, one 
couple must pay considerably more federal estate tax than the other 
similarly situated couple. 
from which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit. Assume the $23,800 is paid by selling farm 
real estate of equivalent value. 
13. See I.R.C. §§ 2001,2010. A $976,200 adjusted gross estate minus a zero marital deduc-
tion equals a $976,200 taxable estate. This taxable estate generates $336,518 in tentative tax from 
which is subtracted the $47,000 unified credit. 
14. See text & note 9 supra. 
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Finally, in disallowing a qualified disclaimer by a surviving joint 
tenant, the tax system also is vulnerable to attack on the simple, yet 
persuasive ground of unfairness. In larger estates, such as those illus-
trated in the examples, any estate plan that concentrates all of the 
couple's wealth in the hands of the surviving spouse generates consider-
ably more estate tax than would be generated if the total wealth had 
been divided between their estates. This unfair result occurs because of 
the progressive nature of this taxiS and because half the estate is taxed 
twice. Well-advised individuals are aware of this fact and typically de-
velop estate plans that avoid concentrated, outright ownership in the 
surviving spouse, either directly or by the planned use of disclaimers. 16 
Unfortunately, joint tenancy ownership between spouses automat-
ically results in concentrated outright ownership in the surviving 
spouse and the attendant adverse estate tax consequences. Disallowing 
the qualified disclaimer of a joint tenancy interest prevents the surviv-
ing spouse from curing this estate tax disaster. Thus, couples who util-
ize joint tenancy as a simple way of transferring ownership to the 
survivor because they lack adequate estate tax knowledge or advice are 
unfairly required to pay a severe estate tax penalty for their lack of 
sophistication. Congress could not have intended that joint tenants be 
punished for not having been warned by legal counsel of the dangers of 
joint tenancy ownership. To impose such a result through the estate 
and gift tax system smacks of unfairness, especially to the ordinary citi-
zen. 
The American Law Institute recognized that it is not always possi-
ble to promote all seven of its goals at the same time. 17 But the only 
goal achieved by the Service's present policy is that of raising revenue. 
That goal, however, can be accomplished in a manner that does not 
discriminate against joint tenancy ownership. 18 
15. See I.R.C. § 2001. The progressive nature of the tax is reflected in the rate structure 
which is 18% in the first bracket, increasing to 70% in subsequent brackets. 
16. Interestingly, the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, included a 
provision that allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an outright bequest but indirectly retain an 
income interest therein if the will provides that property disclaimed by a spouse passes to remain-
dermen with the income to be paid to the disclaiming spouse for life. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4). The 
indirect retention of an income interest allows a surviving spouse to enjoy the income and use of 
all the couple's combined property during lifetime (that property owned outright and that prop-
erty in which a life income interest is indirectly retained) while still avoiding the tax problems of 
concentrated outright ownership. 
17. See text & note 9 supra. 
18. In addition to being inconsistent with three goals of the federal estate and gift tax system 
discussed above, see text at note 14 supra, the Service's denial to joint tenants of the effective use 
of the disclaimer provision is inconsistent with recent developments treating joint tenants more 
like tenants in common for estate and gift tax purposes. For example, the enactment of qualified 
joint interest provisions reflects an attempt to ease the tax burden on joint tenants by providing 
special estate tax treatment to qualified joint tenancies identical to the treatment accorded tenan-
cies in common. See I.R.C. §§ 2040(b), 2515A. 
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II. DISCLAIMER OF THE ACCRETIVE PORTION BY THE SURVIVING 
JOINT TENANTS: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF 
CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY LAW 
In developing a technical analysis of the disclaimer issue, it is 
helpful to identify the relationship between federal and state disclaimer 
statutes. It is also essential to consider whether the four requirements 
of the federal disclaimer law are met when a surviving spouse disclaims 
the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest. 
A. Relationship of Federal and State .Disclaimer Law 
Numerous states have statutes that permit a surviving joint tenant 
to disclaim the accretive portion of the estate derived through survivor-
Ship.19 When a disclaimer is made, the accretive portion passes as 
though the survivor had predeceased the other joint tenant.20 If a dis-
claimer is to be effective in remedying the inequity of the federal estate 
tax, however, it must meet the requirements of a "qualified disclaimer" 
under federal tax law.21 
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, it was clear that a dis-
claimer must be valid under state law before it cou14 be recognized for 
federal tax purposes,22 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added sections 
19. For example, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, § 211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81) states: "A sur-
viving joint tenant may disclaim in whole or in part any property or interest therein held in joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship with a deceased joint tenant. An accretive portion derived 
through survivorship is a separate interest in the property or interest for purposes of this section." 
Id Other states also have disclaimer laws that specifically permit disclaimers of joint tenancy 
property. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-280 1 (A) (Supp. 1980-81); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-
3202(a) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-300 (West Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. 
§ 560:2-801 (1976 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-801(a) (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 1252 (Supp. 1980-81); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 9-201 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 191A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352(a) (1979); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §§ 22-23 (West Supp. 1980-81) (statute broadly describes interests that may be 
disclaimed although no specific provision deals with joint tenancy); S.D.CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 43-4-30.1 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(1) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1l.86.020 (Supp. 1980-81). Generally, all states have statutes allowing the disclaimer of property 
that would pass to the disclaimant by virtue of the state's statute of descent and distribution. For a 
detailed listing of these statutes, see Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Reform Act of 1976: 
Chaos out of Disorder, 31 U.S.C. TAX INST. 811, 822 n.41 (1979). But see Comment, Federal 
Taxation: Section 2518 Disclaimers-Anything But Uniform, 31 U. B.A. L. REV. 188, App. D, at 
209 (1978) (Ala., Miss., N.H., N.J., Nev., S.C., Vt., and Wyo. have no disclaimer statutes applica-
ble to intestate interests). 
20. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). The disclaimer 
severs the joint tenancy. After the severance, the surviving joint tenant becomes a tenant in com-
mon with the takers of the accretive portion because the unities of both time and title are de-
stroyed by the disclaimer. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 618. 
2l. See I.R.C. § 2518 (gift tax), set forth in note 2 supra. Section 2518 applies with respect to 
transfers creating an interest in the disclaimant made after December 31, 1976. H.R. REP. No. 94-
1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-68 (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3419, 
3419-22 [hereinafter cited as Committee Report). For transfers made before January I, 1977, the 
rules relating to disclaimers under pre-§ 2518 law, including the period within which a disclaimer 
must be made, will still apply. Id at 67-68. Disclaimers not governed by § 2518 are governed by 
Treas. Reg. §§ 25.25 11-1 (c), 20.2055-2(c), and 20.2041-3(d). 
22. Prior to enactment of § 2518, the federal consequences of disclaimer were governed by 
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2518 and 2045 to achieve uniform treatment of disclaimers for estate 
and gift tax purposes.23 Therefore, the continuing relevance of state 
disclaimer law is difficult to assess given the congressional intent to 
remedy the confusion caused by the variety of conflicting state laws. 
Practitioners tend to take one of two views: either that the federal 
law provides a "safe harbor," or that both state and federal require-
ments must be met. The "safe harbor" theory views compliance with 
federal requirements as sufficient to effect a qualified disclaimer. This 
theory receives support from language in the legislative history of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976.24 The "safe harbor" theory reflects the intent 
to achieve uniform treatment of disclaimers, but can be criticized as 
being logically inconsistent. 25 Those who contend that both state and 
federal disclaimer requirements must be met argue that a disclaimer 
ineffective under state law cannot possibly meet the requirements of 
section 2518.26 
The Internal Revenue Service seems to have embraced the view 
that a disclaimer must meet both state and federal requirements. In a 
letter ruling, the Service ruled that "proposed disclaimers will be 'qual-
ified disclaimers' . . . if the procedural requirements of [§ 2518] are 
complied. with . . . . Additionally, the disclaimer must meet the re-
quirements of. . . [the state code] so that, under local law, title to the 
property passes to the person who is to take the property as a result of 
the disclaimers."27 Finally, proposed regulation § 25.2518-1(c), pub-
§ 2511 which provides that the gift tax applies to a transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is in 
trust or otherwise, whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible. Section 
25.2511-I(c) of the Treasury Regulations provides that where the law of the state of administra-
tion of the decedent's estate gives a right to refuse to accept ownership, no gift will result if the 
refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer. ''The 
refusal must be ... effective under the local law." Id See Frimmer, Using j)isclaimers in Post 
Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. TAX. 322, 323-25 (1978). 
23. Congress especially meant to eliminate the uncertainties which result from the inconsis-
tencies among local property rules, such as rules governing the proper time within which a dis-
claimer must be made. Committee Report, supra note 21, at 66-67. 
24. The House Report states: 
Ifthe requirements of[§ 2518 or § 2045] are satisfied, a refusal to accept property is to be 
given effect for Federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the applicable local law does 
not technically characterize the refusal as a "disclaimer" or if the person refusing the 
property was considered to have been the owner of the legal title to the property before 
refusing acceptance of the property. 
Id at 67. 
25. If A attempts to disclaim an interest in property and is unsuccessful under state law, then 
title to that property will vest in A. How can it then be argued that A "has not accepted the 
interest or any of its benefits?" McCue, j)isclaimers: A Survey of I.R.C Section 2.518 and the 
Illinois j)isclaimer Statute, 1978 U. ILL. LAW F. 395, 406. Moreover, how can the property "pass 
to" the decedent's spouse or someone other than the disclaimant if the disclaimer is ineffective 
under state law? Frimmer, supra note 22, at 325; J. McCORD, 1976 EsTATE AND GWI'TAX RE-
FORM ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY § 5.28(5), at 253-54 (1977); McCue, supra, at 
406. 
26. See note 25 supra. 
27. IRS Letter RuL 7909055, November 29, 1978 (CCH). See IRS Letter Rul. 7820022, Feb. 
15, 1978 (CCH). 
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lished in the Federal Register on July 22, 1980, clearly states that the 
disclaimer must be effective under local law in order to be a qualified 
disclaimer.28 
But even where the requirements of a qualified disclaimer were 
met, the Internal Revenue Service in a number of private letter rulings 
has ruled that a disclaimer by a surviving joint tenant did not meet the 
requirements of a qualified disclaimer.29 Because the Service's refusal 
to permit surviving joint tenants to disclaim the accretive portion has 
potentially serious federal estate and gift tax consequences, it is neces-
sary to reexamine the federal disclaimer statute. 
B. Requirements for a Qual!fted Disclaimer Under Federal Law 
The threshold requirement for a qualified disclaimer is that there 
be an iJTevocable and unqualified refusal by the disclaimant to accept 
an interest in property.30 This is essentially the definition of a dis-
claimer.31 The four remaining requirements of § 251832 will be ex-
amined to determine whether they support the disclaimer by a 
surviving joint tenant of the accretive portion of joint property. 
1. The Need for a writing 
A disclaimer must be made in writing.33 This requirement is easily 
satisfied by a surviving joint tenant since state law commonly requires 
disclaimers to be written.34 
2. The Passing Requirement 
As a result of the disclaimer, the disclaimed interest must pass 
without any direction on the part of the person making the dis-
claimer.35 In addition, the interest must pass to either the spouse of the 
decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.36 
This federal requirement may be satisfied when the disclaimer is effec-
tive under state law. Illinois law, for example, provides that the dis-
claimed (one-half of the joint) property will pass as if it was owned 
outright by the deceased and as if the disclaiming party had prede-
28. 45 FED. REG. 48925 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c». 
29. IRS Letter Ruls. 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978; 7911005, Nov. 29, 1978; 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978 
(CCH). For a discussion of these rulings, see Section 1II(B)(3) of this Article infta. 
30. I.R.C. § 2518(b); see Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(c), 20.2055-2(c). 
31. See text & note 2 supra. 
32. See note 2 supra. 
33. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1). 
34. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). 
35. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4). 
36. Id. 
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ceased the decedent.37 In this way the property passes without any di-
rection on the part of disclaimant. 
3. The Problem of Prior Acceptance 
a. The IRS position on disclaimers of joint tenancy property 
If a disclaimer is to be effective under § 2518, the disclaimant must 
not have previously accepted the interest or any of its benefits.38 State 
disclaimer law commonly contains a similar requirement. 39 
Numerous private letter rulings involve an attempt by a surviving 
joint tenant to disclaim all or part of the joint property subsequent to 
the death of the other joint tenant. The Service usually imposes a gift 
tax, finding that the disclaimer is not "qualified" since there has been a 
prior acceptance of the property or its benefits.40 The existence of a 
prior acceptance has generally been ascertained by analyzing the rele-
vant state property law.41 
Two substantially identical letter rulings involved an attempt by 
the surviving joint tenant spouse to disclaim the entire joint property. 
In each, the Service found that a taxable gift was made,42 using a two-
step analysis previously embraced by the federal courtS.43 The Service 
first found that Illinois law allows a surviving joint tenant to disclaim 
an interest in jointly held property. Illinois property law was then ana-
lyzed to determine whether there had been an acceptance of the bene-
fits barring disclaimer. The Service found that under Illinois law joint 
tenants are seised, at the time of creation of the joint tenancy, of an 
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); accord, ARIz. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2801(D)(3) (Supp. 1980-81). 
38. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ 2S.2S11-1(c), 20.20SS-2(c). 
39. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(E)(2) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 
§ 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). 
40. See, e.g., IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH). 
41. IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH). Both of these 
rulings deal with I.R.C. § 2511 rather than § 2S18. But see IRS Letter Rul. 780306S, Oct. 21, 1977 
(CCH), in which state law was consulted to determine whether there had been a prior acceptance 
for purposes of§ 2S18(b)(3). Cf. IRS Letter Rul. 7829008, Apr 14, 1978 (CCH), where the Service 
consulted a tax court case, Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) (receipt of income from 
trust over 2S-year period was an acceptance), rather than state law to determine whether there was 
an acceptance for purposes of § 2S11. 
42. IRS Letter Ruls. 7912049, Nov. 30, 1978; 791100S, Nov. 29, 1978 (CCH). The difference 
is that in Letter Ruling 7912049, corporate stock was held in joint tenancy, while in Letter Ruling 
791100S, certificates of deposit and a bank account were held in joint tenancy. 
43. E.g., Krakoffv. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), affd, 439 F.2d 1023 
(6th Cir. 1971); Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affd, 468 F.2d 9S0 
(Sth Cir. 1972). Gifts were found to have been made despite the surviving joint tenants' purported 
disclaimers in both KrakoJ! and Bishop for two reasons. First, state law did not permit disclaimer 
of jointly held property by the surviving joint tenant. Krakoffv. United States, 313 F. Supp. at 
1093; Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. at 1348. Second, the surviving joint tenant in each 
case was found to have accepted the gift upon creation of the joint tenancy. Krakoff v. United 
States, 313 F. Supp. at 1094; Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. at 1348. 
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undivided interest in the whole estate.44 According to this view, the 
rights of each joint tenant vest at the creation of the tenancy and no 
greater right accrues to the survivor by reason of the death of the other. 
The rights already existing in the survivor continue while those of the 
decedent cease to exist.45 Therefore, in both rulings the Service con-
cluded that there had been an acceptance by the survivor of the entire 
property upon creation of the joint tenancy, and the execution of ~he 
disclaimer was actually a taxable gift of the whole interest.46 
Another letter ruling involved an Arizona couple who owned a 
home, securities, and mutual fund shares as joint tenants.47 The repre-
sentative of the estate of the surviving joint tenant renounced whatever 
interest the survivor would have taken by survivorship. As is true in 
Illinois, the Arizona statute specifically allows a surviving joint tenant 
to renounce the accretive portion of the property to which the renounc-
ing tenant woul4 succeed by right of survivorship.48 Nevertheless, the 
Service relied upon a tax court decision49 to find an acceptance of the 
property prior to the death of the first joint tenant. Acceptance was 
found in the deposit of income from the jointly owned assets as well as 
the proceeds of maturities and sales of securities into the joint checking 
account, payment by the spouses of household and normal living ex-
penses from the joint checking account, and occupancy of the jointly 
owned residence by both spouses until the time of their respective 
deaths.50 
44. Both rulings cited Partridge v. Berliner, 325 Ill. 253, 156 N.E. 352 (1927). At common 
law, a joint tenancy was seised "per my et per tout." See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 619. This 
meant that each joint tenant was deemed to hold the whole estate for purposes of tenure and 
survivorship, while for purposes of alienation and forfeiture each joint tenant held an undivided 
share only. Duncan v. Suhy, 378 111104, 109,37 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1941). A tenant in common, by 
contrast, owns only an undivided share in the whole for all purposes. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra 
note 8, § 1795. 
45. The rulings cited KJajbor v. Klajbor, 406 Ill. 513, 94 N.E.2d 502 (1950); Erwin v. Felter, 
283 Ill. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918). 
46. The Service framed the issues in these letter rulings as: 
1. May the surviving joint tenant disclaim? 
2. If so, is the interest disclaimed 
a. only the decedent's share, thus making the survivor's share a transfer that con-
stitutes a gift, or 
b. the entire amount with no gift consequences? 
Because the answer to the first question was negative, the second issue was never discussed. This 
is unfortunate, since the only way to achieve a sensible result in these cases is to determine what 
exactly is disclaimed and whether that is the same interest which was accepted. 
47. IRS Letter RuL 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978 (CCH). 
48. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A)(7), (C)(3) (Supp. 1980-81). 
49. Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961). 
50. IRS Letter RuL 7829008, Apr. 14, 1978 (CCH). In both the Illinois and Arizona in-
stances, the Service has ignored the state's plain statutory language, choosing instead to pursue the 
uncertain notion of acceptance. In Illinois, the language of the Conveyancing Act itself speaks 
against the Service's conclusion. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81) states 
that the right to disclaim is barred by a prior acceptance of the interest or its benefits. Accord, 
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(E)(2) (Supp. 1980-81). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1980-81) says that a surviving joint tenant may disclaim the accretive portion of the 
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b. A reconsideration of the IRS position 
In analyzing the IRS position, it will be helpful to determine 
whether a tenant in common who is bequeathed the remaining tenancy 
in common interest is precluded from making a qualified disclaimer of 
that bequest. It will also be helpful to carefully examine the contempo-
rary similarities and differences between the interest of a tenant in com-
mon and that of a joint tenant. , 
(i) There is no prior acceptance of a tenancy in common interest. 
The federal disclaimer statute permits the transferee of an undivided 
interest to disclaim the whole undivided interest. This conclusion is 
supported by the general language of § 25 I 8 (a) that "any interest" may 
be disclaimed.51 Once the tenant in common meets the writing, timeli-
ness, and undirected disposition requirements of § 2518(b), there is 
nothing inherent in the nature of a tenancy in common to prevent a 
surviving cotenant from disclaiming the decedent's undivided share 
which passes to the survivor by way of descent or bequest. Each tenant 
in common holds a separate title and may enjoy his or her undivided 
interest so long as there is no infringement upon the cotenant's share.52 
No conceptual basis exists for an argument that one tenant in common 
has previously accepted the undivided interest of a cotenant which can-
not now be disclaimed. 
(ii) The only practical difference today between the estates of joint 
tenancy and tenancy in common is the right of survivorship, at least in 
states such as Illinois. The ancient property concepts of joint tenancy 
and tenancy in common have evolved over time in order to serve 
changing policies regarding land ownership. For example, at early 
common law, the policy favoring the aggregation of landed estates in 
the hands of a few gave rise to the joint tenancy estate.53 Current pol-
icy, however, favors alienability of land and has produced legislation 
joint estate. Accord, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(A)(7) (Supp. 1980-81). The only way 
these sections can be consistent is if a joint tenant has not accepted Uie accretive portion, i.e., the 
cotenant's share of the joint property before disclaimer. But the Service argues that the accretive 
portion is accepted because of the very nature of joint tenancy. 
51. I.R.C. § 2518(a). A tenant in common's undivided interest would fall under this heading. 
The language of§ 2518(c)(I) that U(a] disclaimer with respect to an undivided portion of an inter-
est. . . shall be treated as a qualified disclaimer of such portion of the interest" seems to contem-
plate a more complex fact situation. One scholar suggests that the intent of§ 2518(c)(I) might be 
to permit partial disclaimers, for instance, allowing a transferee of a sole interest to accept an 
undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common but disclaim the other undivided one-half. J. 
McCORD, supra note 25, § 5.29(1), at 254-55. See Frimmer, supra note 19, at 838. 
52. The share owned by each tenant in common in Illinois is owned as an entire and separate 
estate. Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 69, 24 N.E. 553, 554 (1890); 2 E. GRIGSBY, ILLINOIS REAL 
PROPERTY § 907 (1948). 
53. E. GRIGSBY, supra note 52, § 917. 
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designed to expedite the termination of joint tenancy interests.54 
The question is the extent to which early common law distinctions 
between tenants in common and joint tenants have evaporated over 
time.55 If these distinctions have become blurred or have disappeared, 
then a policy that discriminates between a tenant in common and a 
joint tenant regarding the right to disclaim an accretive undivided in-
terest cannot be justified. If the property rights of the tenant in com-
mon and joint tenant are essentially the same, to allow one to disclaim 
but not the other on the ground of prior acceptance is inconsistent. 
The following paragraphs compare the treatment of tenants in 
common and joint tenants in states such as Illinois. The analysis in-
cludes a comparison of liability to one's cotenant for rents or profits, 
the ability to acquire legal title from a cotenant by adverse possession, 
rights to improvements, rights and duties to insure and repair, rights to 
be reimbursed for payment of taxes or other charges, effects of leases 
signed by only one co-owner, treatment under statutes concerning par-
tition and homestead exemptions, right to eject a cotenant, and ability 
to utilize the co-owned property as collateral for a loan.56 
Rents and profits. There is no ascertainable difference in present-
day treatment of joint tenants and tenants in common on the issue of 
liability of one's cotenant for rents or profits received by the tenant in 
possession. In an action for partition, a tenant in common must ac-
count to a cotenant for an aliquot portion of the rents and profits actu-
ally received.57 A joint tenant is also liable for rents and profits 
re'ceived in excess of that tenant's share.58 Illinois statutory law plainly 
states that "[w]hen one or more joint tenants [or] tenants in common 
. . . in real estate. . . shall take and use the profits or benefits thereof, 
in greater proportion than his or their interest, such person . . . shall 
account therefor to his . . . co-tenant."59 Little room for controversy. 
54. For example, contemporary partition statutes typically allow any co·owner, including a 
joint tenant, to initiate a partition action the result of which is a termination of the co-ownership. 
4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1820. 
55. At least one contemporary court in dicta has adhered to the ancient doctrine that joint 
tenants are seised of the whole and therefore enjoy greater present rights in co-owned property 
than do tenants in common. Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 109,37 N.E.2d 826,828 (1941). But the 
repetition of scholarly Latin phrases may in fact distort the contemporary underlying substantive 
law. A deeper analysis is warranted. 
56. See generally 4A R. POWELL, Stlpra note 4, ~~ 601-19; E. GRIGSBY, supra note 47, §§ 907, 
918. 
57. Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 648, 183 N.E. 13, 16 (1932); Wolkau v. Wolkau, 299 Ill. 
176, 184, 132 N.E. 507, 511 (1921); Cheney v. Ricks, 187 Ill. 171, 173,58 N.E. 234, 235 (1900). At 
common law, a tenant in common had no remedy against a cotenant unless the latter had been 
appointed bailiff, in which case the tenant in common was liable for what was actually received 
and for what might have been received through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Woolley v. 
Schrader, 116 Ill. 29, 39, 4 N.E. 658, 662 (1886). 
58. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 509, 64 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1946) (dictum); People v. Varel, 
351 Ill. 96, 101-02, 184 N.E. 209, 211-12 (1932). 
59. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1966). 
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remains. 
In the tenancy-in-common context, the question has arisen 
whether a cotenant in possession must pay the rental value of the prop-
erty to the cotenant out of possession. The old rule was that the tenant 
in possession was not liable until a demand was made or until an ouster 
by the tenant in possession.60 In Clarke v. Clarke,61 however, this rule 
was repudiated on the strength of the statutory right to an accounting.62 
Today the rule in Illinois is that rental value in excess of the tenant's 
aliquot share must be paid to the cotenant out ofpossession.63 A simi-
lar result would presumably occur if title were held in joint tenancy.64 
Adverse possession. The acquisition of title by adverse possession 
is fully possible as between cotenants despite the adage that "the pos-
session of one will be presumed to be the possession of all."65 If one 
tenant in common disseises another through an unequivocal ouster and 
the other cotenant has knowledge of this ouster, the statute of limita-
tions will begin to run.66 Tbe burden of proving an ouster (or disseisin) 
is seldom carried as between tenants in common.67 Although there is 
no Illinois case involving an attempt by a joint tenant to take title as 
against a cotenant by adverse possession, there is such a case from the 
California Supreme Court. In Dimmick v. Dimmick, 68 the California 
court applied the reasoning of the tenancy in common cases in holding 
that the plaintiff had not met the burden of proving an ouster.69 This is 
a logical result, since an ouster by a joint tenant is just as inconsistent 
with any other cotenant's right to enjoy the property as an ouster by a 
tenant in common. 
Improvements. Illinois courts apply similar rules to cases involv-
60. Cooper v. Martin, 308 Ill. 224, 230-31, 139 N.E. 68, 70 (1923). 
61. 349 ill. 642, 183 N.E. 13 (1932). 
62. Id at 648, 183 N.E. at 16. 
63. Burkholder v. Burkholder, 10 Ill. App. 2d 565, 565, 135 N.E.2d 504, 505 (1956). 
64. No case has arisen involving a joint tenancy, but the result is presumably the same under 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1966). See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1805, at 193 
n.22. 
65. Knox v. Despain, 156 Ill. App. 134, 139 (1910). 
66. Mercer v. Wayman, 9 Ill. 2d 441,445, 137 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1956); Clarke v. Clarke, 349 
Ill. 642, 646, 183 N.E. 13, 15 (1932). 
67. Steele v. Steele, 220 Ill. 318, 322, 77 N.E. 232, 233 (1906) (disseisin where cotenant sold 
entire tract and grantee took possession of the property); Burgett v. Taliaferro, 118 Ill. 503, 518-19, 
9 N.E. 334, 341 (1886) (disseisin occurred when cotenant made a warranty deed for the entire 
estate). In the following cases, no disseisin was deemed to have occurred: Mercer v. Wayman, 9 
Ill. 2d 441, 137 N.E.2d 815 (1956) (possession, collection of all rents and profits, payment of all 
taxes); Harlan v. Douthit, 379 Ill. 15, 24-25, 39 N.E.2d 345, 349-50 (1942) (payment of taxes); 
Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 183 N.E. 13 (1932) (possession, collection of all rents and profits, 
payment of all taxes); Blackaby v. Blackaby, 185 Ill. 94, 97, 56 N.E. 1053, 1054 (1900) (tenant in 
co=on paid taxes, made improvements, and took control of entire property); Busch v. Huston, 
75 Ill. 343, 347 (1874) (possession, appropriation of rents and profits, making of improvements, 
and payment of taxes). 
68. 58 Cal. 2d 417, 374 P.2d 824, 24 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1962). 
69. Id at 422, 374 P.2d at 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
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ing improvements on joint tenancy and tenancy in common property. 
At partition, a court will attempt to setoff the improved portion to the 
improving cotenant. If this is impractical, the improving cotenant may 
recover the amount that the improvement added to the value of the 
property.70 
With regard to joint tenancy, the courts have said that each coten-
ant has full power to improve the property and that such improvements 
inure to the benefit of all.71 An equivalent result has been reached with 
regard to tenancies in common. In Young v. McKittrick,72 one tenant 
in common drilled an oil well on the common property. When later 
sued for profits by his cotenants, the improving cotenant was allowed a 
setoff for the costs of the improvement.73 The improvement inured to 
the benefit of all tenants in common who were able to reap the profits. 
The statutory action for accounting will prevent disparate results in this 
area. 
Repairs and insurance. Joint tenants have full power to repair the 
joint tenancy property.74 The Illinois Supreme Court in Tindall v. 
Yeats 7S stated that repairs are an incident to all cotenancies, that re-
pairs inure to the benefit of all cotenants, and that all cotenants are 
equally liable for expenses incurred in their making.76 Thus both joint 
tenants and tenants in common have a duty to preserve the estate. 
Both types of cotenants also have an insurable interest in jointly 
held property.77 In Tindall, the court stated that the insurance would 
be for the benefit of all cotenants notwithstanding any clause in the 
contract to the contrary.78 A similar restilt was reached in a tenancy in 
common case, although by a different route. In Estate of Ray,79 the 
court held that the cotenant in possession had a duty to be prudent in 
preserving the common property, and declared the cotenant in posses-
sion a constructive trustee of the insurance proceeds for the benefit of 
his cotenants.80 
Taxes and other expenses. With respect to the removal of charges 
70. Heppe v. Szczepanski, 209 Ill. 88, 107-08, 70 N.E. 737, 744 (1904) (tenancy in common); 
Capogreco v. Capogreco, 61 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 378 N.E.2d 279, 281 (1978) (joint tenancy). 
71. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 508-09, 64 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1946); Jeffers v. Brua, 40 Ill. 
App. 2d 156, 159, 189 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1963). 
72. 267 Ill. App. 267 (1932). 
73. Id at 270. 
74. See cases cited at note 66 supra. 
75. 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946). 
76. Id at 508-09, 64 N.E.2d at 906. 
77. Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever that person 
would profit or gain some advantage from its continued existence and suffer loss or disadvantage 
by its destruction. Reznick v. Home Ins. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1061, 360 N.E.2d 461, 463 
(1977). 
78. 392 Ill. at 509, 64 N.E.2d at 906 (joint tenancy). 
79. 7 Ill. App. 3d 433, 287 N.E.2d 144 (1972). 
80. Id at 440, 287 N.E.2d at 149. 
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on the joint estate, both joint tenants and tenants in common are enti-
tled to reimbursement on an aliquot basis. In Kratzer v. Kratzer, 81 the 
court held that a husband joint tenant who had paid taxes and insur-
ance premiums was entitled to contribution.82 In Carter v. Penn, 83 a 
tenant in common who had advanced money to remove an encum-
brance was entitled to reimbursement on partition.84 In Pure Oil Co. v. 
Byrnes,85 a tenant in common in possession was entitled to reimburse-
ment for money expended for taxes, for labor expended in protecting 
and preserving the common property, and for marketing costS.86 And 
in Heineman v. Hermann,87 a tenant in common who had paid the costs 
of an abstract of title was entitled to an accounting.88 
Leases. The majority view is that neither a joint tenant nor a ten-
ant in common may bind more than that tenant's aliquot portion of the 
joint estate.89 A joint tenant may lease the aliquot portion of the prop-
erty, but the power to do so is subject to the right of cotenants to enjoy 
the property. If one joint tenant executes a lease for the whole property 
without the participation of the cotenants, the lease is presumed to be 
for the benefit of all.90 A nonsigning joint tenant who objects to the 
purported lease of the entire premises, however, has a right to eject the 
lessee.91 Each tenant in common has an equal right to enter onto the 
whole property but may not exclude cotenants. In practice, then, a ten-
ant in common, like a joint tenant, may lease only the undivided inter-
est possessed by that tenant.92 
Other treatment. Three other Illinois statutes illustrate the similar-
81. 130 Ill. App. 2d 762, 266 N.E.2d 419 (l971). 
82. Id at 768-69, 266 N.E.2d at 423. 
83. 99 Ill. 390 (1881). 
84. Id at 396. 
85. 388 Ill. 26, 57 N.E.2d 356 (1944). 
86. Id at 39, 57 N.E.2d at 362. 
87. 385 Ill. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263 (1943). 
88. Id at 199, 52 N.E.2d at 267. 
89. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566,572-73 (8th Cir. 1924) (tenancy in common); 
Graham v. Allen, II Ariz. App. 207, 209, 463 P.2d 102, 104 (1970) (joint tenancy); Swartzbaugh v. 
Sampson, II Cal. App. 2d 451, 458, 54 P.2d 73, 77 (1936) (joint tenancy). As these cases demon-
strate, there is no difference between joint tenants and tenants in common regarding a cotenant's 
right to lease. For a collection of cases on leases by cotenants, see Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 797 (1956). 
90. Booth v. Cebula, 25 Ill. App. 2d 411,418, 166 N.E.2d 618, 621 (1960). In this case, one 
joint tenant had leased the entire property under a lease containing an exculpatory clause. When 
the lessee sued the nonsigningjoint tenant, the latter was allowed to invoke the exculpatory clause 
since the lease was presumed to be for the benefit of both cotenants. Id See Janusz v. Kaleta. 57 
Ill. App. 2d 127, 207 N.E.2d 142 (l965). 
91. In Reiger v. Bruce, 322 Ill. App. 689, 54 N.E.2d 770 (l944). a nonsigningjoint tenant was 
allowed to bring an action of forcible entry and detainer to recover the property from the lessee. 
The lessee does not, however, lose its rights against the signing joint tenant. National Gas & Oil 
Co. v. Rizer, 20 Ill. App. 2d 332, 335, 155 N.E.2d 848, 849 (1959). 
92. See Thomas v. Farr, 380 Ill. 429, 434, 44 N.E.2d 434, 437 (1942). Bul see Schwartz v. 
McQuaid, 214 Ill. 357, 73 N.E. 582 (1905), where one tenant in common purported to lease the 
entire estate. The lessee was in possession and paid rent for several months. The court presumed. 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the lease was made with the knowledge and con-
sent of all the cotenants. Id at 361, 73 N.E. at 584. See also Gridley v. Wood. 206 111. App. 505. 
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ity in treatment of joint tenants and tenants in common. The first is the 
partition statute by which any interested person may compel partition 
oflands held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common.93 The second is 
the homestead exemption which is specifically inapplicable in any ac-
tion between joint tenants or tenants in common.94 Third, in an action 
brought by a joint tenant or a tenant in common to eject a cotenant, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually ousted the plaintiff or 
denied the plaintifl's rights.9s 
Another feature common to both tenancies is the ability to convert 
outright ownership by one person into either a tenancy in common or a 
joint tenancy. Illinois statutes allow outright ownership to be con-
verted to a joint tenancy ownership by deeding the property directly 
from the original owner to that original owner and another as joint 
tenants.96 In an earlier time, it would have been necessary to take title 
through a "straw person" to preserve the four unities of time, title, in-
terest, and possession.97 
Severance and creditor's rights. The doctrine of severance further 
illustrates the true dimensions of the present interest enjoyed by a joint 
tenant. Any action by a cotenant that destroys one of the four unities 
of a joint tenancy converts that joint tenancy into a tenancy in common 
and destroys the right of survivorship.98 This discussion focuses on the 
unity of possession since it is directly related to the joint tenant's tenure 
of the property. 
The fact that a certain property transaction severs a joint tenancy 
indicates the functionally aliquot nature of the present interest enjoyed 
by joint tenants. For example, a conveyance by deed of one cotenant's 
interest in the joint property effects a severance.99 Likewise, an execu-
tory written agreement to convey the joint tenant's interest has been 
held to sever the joint tenancy.lOO 
510 (1917), where some of the nonsigning cotenanlS knew of the lease, never objected to it, and 
had accepted rent from the lessee. Id 
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106, § 44 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). 
94. Id ch. 52, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). Thus, in an action to compel partition of 
jointly owned property, one cotenant may not setoff the homestead as against the other. Rosen-
baum v. Rosenbaum, 65 Ill. App. 3d 228,232,382 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1978) (joint tenancy); Phillips 
v. Phillips, 56 Ill. App. 3d 276, 280, 372 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (1978) (joint tenancy); Gottemoller v. 
Gottemoller, 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693, 346 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1976) (tenancy in common). 
95. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 45, § 26 (Smith-Hurd 1944). 
96. Id ch. 76, § 1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1966). 
97. See 4A R. POWELL, supra note 4, ~ 616. 
98. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 451, 61 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1945). The four unities at 
common law were unity of time, title, interest, and possession. In tenancies by the entirety there 
was a fifth requirement-unity of person. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1784, at 64. A divorce 
destroys this unity. Id § 1792, at 121-22. 
99. Szymczak v. Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 545, 138 N.E. 218, 220 (1923). Lawler v. Bryne, 252 
Ill. 194, 196, 96 N.E. 892, 892 (1911). 
100. Naiburg v. Hendriksen, 370 Ill. 502, 505, 19 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1939). 
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Uncertainty exists in Illiniois as to whether a creditor's lien or a 
mortgage severs the joint tenancy. The whole subject matter of credi-
tors' rights in joint tenancy property interests is beset by conflicting pol-
icies. The outcome of these conflicts is particularly relevant to the 
question of whether joint tenants enjoy a greater or lesser present inter-
est in joint property than do tenants in common. It must be 
remembered that the Service views the joint tenant's rights as greater, 
relying on the seisin per tout doctrine. 101 
As will become apparent, both joint tenants and tenants in com-
mon are liable to have their fractional interests taken in satisfaction of 
debts. Assume that a judgment creditor of a cotenant has properly re-
corded the judgment and has thereby obtained a lien against all of the 
debtor-cotenant's real property located in the county. If the debtor is a 
tenant in common, upon his death the debtor's undivided interest in the 
property passes to the debtor's estate.102 The lien retains its viability as 
against the undivided interest. 103 Now suppose that the debtor is in-
stead a joint tenant. If the debtor dies before the joint tenancy is sev-
ered, the surviving joint tenant takes the whole joint property by right 
of survivorship, free and clear of the lien. 104 As recently stated by an 
Illinois appellate court, the lien expires at the moment of death because 
there is no longer any interest to which it can attach. 105 
To effect a severance of a joint tenancy under Illinois law, it is not 
enough that a judgment creditor obtain a lien and then levy upon the 
property. The diminution of the debtor/joint tenant's interest resulting 
from these acts by the creditor has been heJd insufficient to destroy the 
unity of interest. 106 In Jackson v. Lacey, 107 a judgment creditor of a 
joint tenant had caused the joint tenant's interest in the property to be 
sold. The debtor/joint tenant died before the expiration of the redemp-
tion period. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the surviving joint 
tenant took the whole property free and clear of the creditor's lien since 
101. See text & notes 35-40 supra, 116 iI!fra. 
102. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1793. 
103. Id "Each tenant in co=on has a separate and distinct freehold title. Each holds his 
title and interest independently of the others. His interest therefore can be transferred, devised or 
incumbered separately and without consent of the other cotenants." Id at 137. Accordingly,just 
as a lien on real estate owned individually survives the death of the owner, so too does the lien 
created by a tenant in co=on survive the death of the tenant in co=on. 
104. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Olson, 27 Ill. App. 432, 434, 325 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1975). The 
court considered § 219(b) of the Probate Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 20-19 (Smith-Hurd 
1978), entitled "No Exoneration of Encumbered Interests in Real Estate." The court concluded 
that this section was not intended to alter the creditor's rights or the doctrine of severance in 
Illinois, and under that doctrine the lien was extinguished at the moment of the debtor's death. 
See People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958) (mortgage); Gau v. Hyland, 230 
Minn. 235, 41 N.W.2d 444 (1950) (old age assistance liens). 
105. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v Olson, 27 Ill. App. 3d 432, 434, 325 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1975). 
106. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 454, 61 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1945). 
107. 408 Ill. 530, 97 N.E.2d 839 (1951). 
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there had not been a severance before the debtor/joint tenant died. 108 
When the creditor is a mortgagee of a joint tenancy interest, the 
outcome upon the death of the debtor-joint tenant is less certain. The 
matter of severance turns upon whether Illinois follows a title, hybrid, 
or lien theory of mortgages. 109 If Illinois is a title jurisdiction, convey-
ance of a mortgage by the joint tenant will sever the tenancy. 1 10 Under 
this theory, a joint tenant has the same mortgagable interest that a ten-
ant in common has. 111 It is more likely, however, that Illinois is a lien 
jurisdiction. Under the lien theory, there is no severance and the mort-
gagee holds only a lien which may evaporate if the mortgaging joint 
tenant is the first to die. 112 
As is apparent from the preceding paragraphs, the problem of the 
disappearing lien exists as to both general liens, such as judgment liens, 
and specific liens, such as mortgages.- The existence of the problem 
supports the conclusion that joint tenants currently enjoy lesser rights 
in the joint property than do tenants in common. An important benefit 
of land ownership is the ability to use that land as security to obtain 
loans. In view of the disappearing lien problem, however, a lender is 
less likely to accept a mortgage or other security interest in a joint ten-
ancy interest than in a tenancy in common interest. Unless the joint 
tenant severs and thereby destroys the right of survivorship, a joint ten-
ancy interest is practically worthless as collateral. 113 
Right of Survivorship. The right of survivorship is the final distin-
guishing characteristic between joint tenancies and tenancies in com-
mon. 114 This distinction has been eroded in Illinois, however, since the 
Illinois legislature has enabled the surviving joint tenant to disclaim the 
108. Id at 531, 97 N.E.2d at 840. 
109. Under the title theory, conveyance of a mortgage interest severs a joint tenancy. See 
Mattis, supra note 5, at 49. Early joint tenancy cases contain dictum asserting this theory. See, 
e.g., Hardin v. Wolf, 318 Ill. 48, 59, 148 N.E. 868, 872 (1925); Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194, 196,96 
N.E. 892, 892 (1911). The hybrid theory received some attention in Illinois in Central Republic 
Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co., 279 Ill. App. 492, 496 (1935). The modem cases assert that 
Illinois is a lien jurisdiction, although none of these cases involve the question of severance of a 
joint tenancy. Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Ass'n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 25, 317 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1974); Kling 
v. Ghilarducci, 3 Ill. 2d 454, 460, 121 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1954); Merrick v. DaehIer, 5 Ill. App. 3d 
269, 272, 282 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1972). 
110. See Mattis, supra note 5, at 49. 
Ill. Since the conveyance of the mortgage by a joint tenant severs the joint tenancy thereby 
creating a tenancy in common, obviously the joint tenant (now a tenant in common) has the same 
mortgagable interest as one who is a tenant in common from the start. 
112. See Mattis, supra note 5, at 55-58. 
113. This problem, especially as related to mortgages, is thoroughly explored in Mattis, supra 
note 5. Mattis' solution is the same as that offered by the Indiana Supreme Court in Wilkins v. 
Young, 144 Ind. I, 41 N.E. 68 (1895). The court held that a joint tenant might mortgage his 
interest in the joint estate in like manner as though he were a tenant in common. Id at 7, 41 N.E. 
at 70. The right of survivorship is destroyed or suspended to the extent of the mortgage lien. Id 
At the death of the tenant, the survivor will succeed only to the equity of redemption. Id 
114. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1779. 
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accretive portion derived through survivorship following the death of 
the other joint tenant. 115 In effect, this statute permits a post mortem 
severance of the joint tenancy. 
The previous paragraphs have demonstrated that a joint tenant 
does not enjoy a greater present right in property than does a tenant in 
common. Thus, as a practical matter, a joint tenancy is nothing more 
than a tenancy in common with a built-in will. 
(iii) No practical reason exists to allow tenants in common to dis-
claim their deceased cotenant's share in the joint property, while denying 
that ability to joint tenants. The foregoing discussion of Illinois prop-
erty law demonstrates the absurdity of the Service's position that joint 
tenants, because they are supposedly seised of the whole, enjoy greater 
present rights in the joint property than do tenants in common. Joint 
tenants are treated aliquotly, as are tenants in common. If anything, a 
joint tenant enjoys a lesser present interest in the joint property than do 
tenants in common because of the difficulty a joint tenant will have in 
using the land as security. 
The Service has rested its analysis of acceptance on the outdated 
doctrine of sesin per tout: that the joint tenant holds the entire estate 
from the original investiture, and acquires no additional interest by vir-
tue of the death of the other joint tenant. 116 The actual nature of a joint 
tenancy interest should be acknowledged by the Service as it has been 
by the Supreme Courts of Illinois and the United States. In Bradley v. 
FOX,117 where one joint tenant had murdered the other, the Illinois 
Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust upon one-half of the joint 
property to prevent the murderer from enjoying the accretive portion 
which he would have received as survivor.118 In United States v. Ja-
cobs, 119 Justice Black repudiated the seisin per tout doctrine as follows: 
Upon the death of her co-tenant [the wife] for the first time became 
possessed of the sole right to sell the entire property without risk of 
loss which might have resulted from partition or separate sale of her 
interest while decedent lived. There was-at his death-a distinct 
shifting of economic interest, a decided change for the survivor's 
benefit. 120 
These cases make it clear that in reality the joint tenant does not own 
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). See text & note 19 supra. 
116. See text & notes 41-50 supra. 
117. 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955). See Mattis, supra note 5, at 31 n.15. 
118. 7 Ill. 2d at 117, 129 N.E.2d at 705. 
119. 306 U.S. 363 (1939). 
120. Id at 371. Jacobs involved the law ofa state which does not recognize the common law 
tenancy by the entirety as being distinct from a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between 
spouses. There are a number of states which no longer recognize tenancy by the entirety. See 4 
G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1791. 
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the whole estate from the date of creation of the tenancy, but instead 
succeeds to the accretive portion only upon the death of the other joint 
tenant. 
c. Special consideration of tenancy by the entirety 
In the many states that still recognize tenancy by the entirety, the 
particular incidents of the estate vary widely. There are, however, fun-
damental bases of similarity among the states which may be extracted 
as relevant to the matter of prior acceptance. 
A tenancy by the entirety is essentially a joint tenancy between 
husband and wife. 121 Thus, when one spouse dies, the property is 
owned by the surviving spouse. 122 A tenancy by the entirety, however, 
requires a fifth unity beyond those necessary to create a joint tenancy-
the unity of person. 123 The archaic notion that husband and wife were 
one person resulted in the rule that an estate by the entirety could be 
destroyed or terminated only by the joint acts of the husband and wife 
or by divorce, and not by the unilateral act of either one of them. 124 
Further, the- estate by the entirety was not liable for the separate debts 
of either spouse, and neither spouse could encumber the land without 
the consent of the other. 125 These incidents of an estate by the entirety 
do not conclusively distinguish tenants in common from tenants by the 
entirety. 
Indeed, it is widely recognized that tenants by the entirety have an 
equal right to the use and enjoyment of the estate during their joint 
lives.126 In effect, they become tenants in common or joint tenants of 
the use of the estate, each being entitled to one-half of the rents and 
profits therefrom during their joint lives, with the power in each to dis-
pose of or to encumber his or her moiety. 127 In only two states does the 
husband continue to enjoy the right to all of the income from the prop-
erty.128 To a large extent, then, the present rights of tenants in common 
and tenants by the entirety to enjoy the joint estate are similar. A sur-
viving tenant by the entirety therefore should not be automatically 
barred from disclaiming the accretive portion. 
The difference between an estate by the entirety and the other two 
121. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1786, at 80. 
122. Id § 1792, at 128. 
123. Id § 1786, at 80. 
124. Id § 1792, at 125-26 n.20. 
125. Id § 1790, at 107-08 n.19. 
126. Id § 1789, at 100; D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 5, at 653. See State v. Brady, 
53 Mo. AJ?p. 202, 206 (1893); Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 657, 9 A. 695, 698 (1887); 
Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 315, 39 N.E. 337, 339 (1895). 
127. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1789, at 100. 
128. Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 490-91, 70 N.E.2d 294, 297 (1946); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 
200, 206-07, 124 S.E. 566, 569-70 (1924). 
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forms of concurrent ownership is that a tenant by the entirety may not 
have the ability to dispose of his or her moiety.129 In practical terms, 
this aspect of "seisin of the whole" is a limitation upon the individual 
tenant's enjoyment of the property. Thus, it is absurd to construe "sei-
sin of the whole" as a prior acceptance of the accretive portion of the 
estate. Since a tenant by the entirety has a right to present enjoyment 
equivalent to that enjoyed by a tenant in common or a joint tenant, the 
, three types of tenancies should be treated similarly as far as the issue of 
prior acceptance is concerned. 
4. The Time Within Which a .Disclaimer Must Be Made 
The written disclaimer must be received by the transferor of the 
interest, the transferor's legal representative, or the holder of the legal 
title to the property disclaimed not later than the date which is nine 
months after the later of the day on which the transfer creating the 
interest in such person is made, or the day on which such person attains 
age twenty-one.130 State disclaimer statutes establish the proper time 
for making a disclaimer. 131 It is entirely possible that a given dis-
claimer will satisfy both state and federal time requirements. 
The legislative history of section 2518 makes it clear that the nine-
month period for making a disclaimer is to be determined in reference 
to each taxable transfer. 132 For purposes of section 2518(b )(2), a trans-
fer is deemed to be made when it is treated as a completed transfer for 
gift tax purposes (with respect to inter vivos transfers) or upon the date 
of decedent's death (with respect to testamentary transfers).133 A dis-
claimer of the accretive portion by a surviving joint tenant spouse upon 
the death of the first spouse is consistent with this congressional intent. 
For federal estate and gift tax purposes, joint tenancy property is 
taxed in one of two ways. When the original contribution of the joint 
tenants is not equal,134 either there is an inter vivos gift of one-half the 
value of the property upon creation of the joint tenancy and a testa-
mentary transfer of one-half the value of the property when the first 
129. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1784, at 63. 
130. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-I(c) requires that a disclaimer be made 
"within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existen~ of the transfer." 
131. See., e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801(C)(3) (Supp. 1980-81); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
30, § 212 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). 
132. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, S. REP. No. 94-
1236, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 607, 623-24, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4246, 
4262. See 45 FED. REG. 48926 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2». 
133. H.R. REp. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Coos CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 3419, 3421. See 45 FED. REG. 48,926 (1980) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-
2(c)(2». 
134. This explanation assumes that the first joint tenant spouse to die was the one who had 
contributed all the consideration for the acquisition of the property. This is frequently the farm 
husband. 
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joint tenant dies,135 or there is a testamentary transfer of the entire 
value of the property when the first joint tenant dies. 136 Under either 
scheme of taxation, it is clear that for tax purposes, a maximum of one-
half of the value of the joint property is transferred inter vivos from the 
donor to the donee.137 If the original contribution of the joint tenants 
was equal, there is no inter vivos taxable event at all. 138 In other words, 
there is never an inter vivos taxable transfer of the whole estate to the 
donee joint tenant that would trigger the timing provision of the dis-
claimer statute as to the accretive portion. Therefore, the survivor need 
not disclaim the accretive portion until nine months after death. 
CONCLUSION 
Where a state has enacted a disclaimer statute allowing a surviving 
joint tenant to disclaim the accretive portion of a joint tenancy interest 
or a tenancy by the entirety interest, the requirements for a qualified 
disclaimer under federal law can also be met. Clearly, the federal re-
quirements for a ''writing'' and a "passing" can be met. 
The requirement that there be no prior acceptance can also be met 
as to the accretive portion of the estate. Under contemporary property 
law, a joint tenant, like an equal tenant in common, accepts an interest 
only in his or her aliquot share at the time the tenancy is created. The 
joint tenant has no greater right in the other cotenant's interest than 
does the tenant in common. In fact, the joint tenant arguably has a 
lesser right in the entire estate than the tenant in common because the 
joint tenant may have greater difficulty using the estate as collateral for 
a loan. 
The remaining federal requirement that the disclaimer be made 
within nine months can be met because the nine-month period begins 
to run when the taxable transfer is made. Since the transfer of the 
accretive portion is never a taxable event until the first joint tenant dies, 
a surviving spouse always has nine months from the date of death to 
disclaim the accretive portion of the joint tenancy property. 
It is apparent that the present position of the Service is erroneous 
and should be changed. The appropriateness of this change, however, 
is not grounded solely in the technical application of current statutes. 
The need to permit a qualified disclaimer of the accretive portion of 
135. This is a "qualified joint interest" under I.R.C. § 2040(b). 
136. Id § 2040(a). 
137. Under similar circumstances, the creation of an equal tenancy in common constitutes an 
inter vivos gift of one-half the value of the joint property. 
138. I.R.C. § 2515. Except for the accretive portion, however, the disclaimer is not "qualified" 
because the surviving spouse would have accepted the nonaccrelive portion of the property when 
the joint tenancy was created. 
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joint tenancy interests is also supported by solid policy considerations. 
Only by allowing such disclaimers can our federal estate and gift tax 
system achieve the desirable goals of eliminating disparate tax results 
arising solely because of the form of the transfer, providing similar tax 
treatment for taxpayers similarly situated, and creating a tax structure 
perceived as fair by the general population. 
